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America's Past-time and the Art of Diplomacy
ALYSON ST. PIERRE*
ABSTRACT
As organizations and corporations construct an international reach,
they become influential actors in foreign relations between sovereign
countries. Particularly, while Major League Baseball continues to recruit
players and build a large fan base across the globe, it increases its ability
to facilitate civil relations between the United States and other nations.
An exploration of how professional baseball provides a useful platform to
improve diplomatic relations between the United States and Cuba best
exemplifies how the League can promote change. Although the United
States and Cuba have had a rather tumultuous relationship in recent
history, a coordinated effort to improve the treatment of Cuban baseball
players through changes in League rules and federal laws has the ability
to spark a unified commitment to improved diplomacy. The proposed
changes to improve relations with Cuba, can also be used by Major
League Baseball and the United States to increase diplomatic success
with other nations who have a vested interest in the success and fair
treatment of their native baseball players.
INTRODUCTION
Since its invention in the 1840s, baseball has been a popular sport
throughout the United States. Today, Major League Baseball (MLB)
draws millions of fans from around the world who religiously watch
thirty big league teams compete for the October pennant on an annual
basis.' Beyond those top-level teams, there is a sprawling network of
* Alyson St. Pierre is a presumptive J.D. Candidate for the Class of 2018, Indiana
University Maurer School of Law. She has a B.A. in History with a specialization in
United States History from Indiana University, Class of 2015. Enjoying the game of
baseball is an integral part of the author's identity. This paper is dedicated to her brother,
Zack St. Pierre, who exemplifies determination and passion every time he steps onto the
field.
1. See Team-by-Team Information, MLB.CoM, http://mlb.mlb.com/team/index.jsp (last
visited Mar. 9, 2018); see also 2017 MLB Attendance and Team Age, BASEBALL
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affiliated minor league and privately-owned teams that strive to develop
players who will eventually make it onto the MLB stage. 2 Even at the
minor league level, professional baseball in America serves as a beacon
of hope for many talented players from developing or struggling nations
in Latin America and the Caribbean. 3 Large contracts, incomparable in
size to the average wages in their home countries, and American
freedoms draw foreign players to MLB.4 The road to MLB is difficult for
any baseball player seeking to play professionally, but for some foreign
players the journey can be costly and perilous.5
Foreign baseball players who desire to come to the United States
face a myriad of immigration laws and MLB guidelines, which impact
individual players differently depending on their home country.6 Those
laws and guidelines influence how foreign players choose to enter the
country.7 MLB requires that residents of the United States, Canada, or
Puerto Rico must enter the amateur draft before they can contract with
a professional team. 8 Players who reside outside of the United States,
Canada, or Puerto Rico are free to contract with any team without
REFERENCE, https://www.baseball-reference.com/leagues/MLB/2017-misc.shtml (last
visited Mar. 9, 2018).
2. See Teams by Name, MILB.COM, http://www.milb.com/milb/info/teams.jsp (last
visited Mar. 9, 2018).
3. See Aaron Klein & Jake Marcus, Note, United States-Cuba Normalized Relations
and the MLB Influence: The Baseball Coalition Committee, 47 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
258, 270 (2016) ("The average Cuban baseball player makes forty-dollars per month ....
[T]he average MLB salary in 2013 was almost $3.4 million, which equates to
approximately $283,000 per month.").
4. See id. ("The disparity in potential salary, coupled with the poor conditions in
Cuba, creates a large incentive to escape, even at the expense of being branded disloyal to
Cuba and being put through dangerous and traumatic experiences.").
5. See Matthew J. Frankel, Note, Major League Problems: Baseball's Broken System of
Cuban Defection, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 383, 383-84 (2005) (discussing Rene Arocha,
the first Cuban baseball player to defect in order to play in the United States, cast off the
only team he had ever known and left his family behind to seek a career in the MLB.); see
also Klein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 262 (discussing Cuban player Yasiel Puig scaled
some of the most isolated coasts in the world and evaded Cuban police in order to reach
his smugglers on his fifth attempt to defect. "[T]ales of failed attempts to flee, run-ins with
Cuban police, kidnappings, briberies, forgeries, and money laundering are common
amongst those who have left Cuba to pursue professional baseball careers.").
6. See Matthew N. Greller, Note, Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Fastball
Pitchers Yearning for Strike Three: How Baseball Diplomacy Can Revitalize Major League
Baseball and United States-Cuba Relations, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1647, 1655-79 (1999).
7. See Rachel D. Solomon, Note, Cuban Baseball Players, the Unlucky Ones: United
States-Cuban Professional Baseball Relations Should be an Integral Part of the United
States-Cuba Relationship, 10 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 153, 160 (2011).
8. See id. at 158-59 (discussing Rule 3(a)(1)(A) of the Major League Baseball Rules
and its application to legal residents of the United States, Canada, and Puerto Rico and its
requirement that those players participate in the Rule 4 amateur draft).
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participating in the draft.9 Once a professional team is interested in a
foreign player, the player must obtain one of two appropriate visas to
play and be employed in the United States. 10 That system, though
informal, seems fairly straightforward and for most foreign players, it
is.11 Unfortunately, for players who reside in nations, like Cuba, with
very restrictive immigration policies, that system pushes them to make
difficult choices. 12
In addition to the impact immigration and MLB policies have on
individual lives and choices, those policies have also played a role in the
diplomatic relationship between various Latin American or Caribbean
countries and the United States. 13 This impact is clearest when
considering the rocky relationship between Cuba and the United
States. 14 Within that relationship, baseball has proven to be a common
interest and thus, grounds for cooperation; however, the current system
also places a strain on the relationship due to the emigration of Cuban
players to the United States. 15 This paper sets out to demonstrate that
the current system, made up of the embargo, MLB guidelines, and
immigration laws, can be reformed to make baseball an effective vehicle
of positive change in United States-Cuban relations. Additionally, the
proposed reform, although in part inapplicable to nations without
embargoes, can be used to optimize relationships with other Latin
American and Caribbean nations and further increase opportunities for
foreign players.
This paper will begin with a discussion of the transfer of baseball
players between the United States and Cuba prior to 1959 and
baseball's role in the development of United States-Cuban relations
during the subsequent decades. Then, this paper will illuminate the
current system for immigration into the United States, both for Cuban
9. See id. (discussing how any individual residing outside of these countries or
territories may contract with any MLB team as a free agent so long as they will reach the
age of seventeen by the end of their signing season).
10. See Greller, supra note 6, at 1655-56 ("[T]he Immigration Act provides specific visa
categories, known as the 'O' and 'P' categories, for the arrival of athletes who do not intend
to permanently reside in the United States.").
11. See Emily B. Ottenson, Note, The Social Cost of Baseball: Addressing the Effects of
Major League Baseball Recruitment in Latin America and the Caribbean, 13 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 767, 776 (2014).
12. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 383-84.
13. See Ottenson, supra note 11, at 770-71.
14. See Greller, supra note 6, at 1652-54.
15. See Ottenson, supra note 11, at 771 ("MLB teams aggressively recruit Latin
American and Caribbean players, hoping to find the superstars of tomorrow.
Unfortunately, this process provides little reward for the players' countries or themselves,
short of the lucrative contracts that less than one percent of these players can hope to
secure in the United States.").
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and other foreign players. The third section will contemplate the flaws
in the current system and how those flaws impact other nations. The
fourth will address available reforms to rectify those flaws. And, finally,
the fifth will propose a repayment and tax system that will alleviate the
loss of revenue foreign nations suffer from the loss of talent while
opening the door to the individual players seeking a different life.
PRIOR TO 1959
Baseball began in New York City in the 1840s and quickly gained
popularity throughout the country. 16 As the game spread, it became
synonymous with American values and began leaving its mark on
American culture.1 7 The impact of baseball was not lost on Cuban
students and sailors located in the United States.18 When the sailors
and students returned to their home country, they brought America's
pastime with them.19 Baseball was introduced to Cuba during an
incredibly tumultuous and significant time. 20 When the sport first came
to the island, Cuba was under Spanish rule. 21 And as baseball gained
popularity, the Cuban people were fighting for their independence. 22 As
a result, baseball became a distinct symbol of change and national
identity for the newly autonomous Cuba.23
Starting in 1878, professional leagues from Cuba began operating
and competing with their American counterparts. 24 This competition
established a bridge between the two countries based on their common
16. See Klein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 265.
17. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 156 ("Similar to its American counterpart, 'Cuban
baseball has always been tightly intertwined with history, politics, and social change."');
see also John Rebstock, How Baseball Echoes U.S. Immigration Patterns and Social
History, J-1 JOURNEYS (Oct. 10, 2014), http://j ljourneys.org/how-baseball-echoes-ameri
can-immigration-patterns-and-social-history/ ("American English is shaped by baseball in
many subtle ways. Ever hear someone describe a great success as 'hitting a home run,' or
mention 'striking out' when they try to do something and fail?").
18. See Klein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 265.
19. Id.
20. See id. at 266.
21. See id.
22. See id.
23. See id. ("Cuban baseball emerged as a rejection of Spanish hegemony. Cuban
baseball became symbolic of social change and independence. Cubans used baseball to
establish a national identity that was distinct from Spain and as a symbol of their
national pride.").
24. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 156.
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interest.25 For the next fifty years, Cuban and American baseball
players competed both against, and with, one another as they travelled
freely between the two nations. 26 Cuban players would come to the
United States and play at all professional levels while American players
would migrate to Cuba during the winter to develop their talents. 27
American teams established spring training facilities in Cuba and the
Cincinnati Redlegs (predecessor to the current Cincinnati Reds)
established a minor league franchise in Havana.28
AFTER 1959 AND THE CUBAN EMBARGO
When Fidel Castro overthrew the Cuban government in 1959, he
instated a swath of nation-wide changes that reflected his socialist
ideals. 29 Some of those changes included abolishing professional
baseball in Cuba and erecting a government-run, amateur system in its
place. 30 Additionally, Castro placed limits on the wages earned by
Cuban players that were comparable to the wages earned by most of the
Cuban labor force. 31 During the transition to Castro's socialist
government, many Cuban citizens attempted to defect to the United
States, seeking sanctuary.32 Due to baseball's prominent role in the new
administration, players who defected faced harsh penalties and were
officially labeled as traitors by the government. 33
Following the establishment of the Castro government, the United
States responded by cutting all diplomatic ties with Cuba. 34 In 1963,
President John F. Kennedy signed the Cuba Assets Control Regulations
into law, which laid out the rules that formed the Cuban embargo.35 In
25. See id. ("At this time, 'baseball became a cultural bridge between Cuba and the
United States, with ballplayers constantly in transit from one country to the other."'
(quoting Frankel, supra note 5, at 388)).
26. See Klein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 265.
27. See id.
28. See id. at 266.
29. See id. at 267 ("The new [amateur] system was 'centered on a socialist paradigm of
amateur sports motivated by national ideals rather than money.") (quoting Solomon, 10 J.
INT'L Bus. & L. at 156-57).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 157.
33. See Klein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 269 ("Cuban players that choose to leave are
,given the label traidores al bdisbol, or "baseball traitors," by the [Cuban] government.'
(quoting Solomon, supra note 7, at 154)).
34. Id. at 267.
35. Id. at 268 (discussing that The Cuba Assets Control Regulations are based on the
Trading With the Enemy Act (TWEA); section 5(b) of the TWEA allows the President of
the United States to "investigate, regulate, direct and compel, nullify, void, prevent or
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1996, the United States enacted the Helms-Burton Act, which
strengthened the embargo and further attempted to place global
pressure on the Cubans to adopt a democratic form of government. 36
The Cuban embargo prohibited United States citizens and corporations
from conducting business, transferring property, or dealing with the
Cuban government and Cuban nationals. 37
Castro's ascension to power and the reactionary embargo brought to
an end the relationship that American and Cuban baseball players had
built over nearly a century; 38 however, over the subsequent years,
approximately two hundred Cuban baseball players have defected from
their home country and sought asylum on United States soil.39 Thirty-
six of those two hundred have made it to the major leagues and have
attracted a large following of fans. 40 The respect and cultural
significance bestowed on baseball players means that those thirty-six
individuals shine a bright light on the plight of the Cuban defector.41
Baseball's prominent place in both American and Cuban culture means
that it is a perfect vehicle for bringing about systemic change between
the two nations. 42
MLB GUIDELINES, IMMIGRATION LAWS, AND THEIR IMPACT ON MIGRATION
MLB has organizational rules that dictate the signing of all
prospective players, both native and foreign. 43 These rules state that
any prospective player who resides in the United States, Canada, or
prohibit, any acquisition holding, withholding, use, transfer, withdrawal, transportation,
importation or exportation of, or dealing in, or exercising any right, power, or privilege
with respect to, or transaction involving, any property in which any foreign country or a
national thereof has any interest by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to
the jurisdiction of the United States.").
36. Id. at 268-69.
37. Id.
38. Frankel, supra note 5, at 389.
39. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 154; see also Cuban Adjustment Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1255
(2012) (providing the opportunity of asylum for Cuban immigrants who reach United
States soil).
40. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 154.
41. Id.
42. See Klein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 313 (discussing the recent interactions
between the United States and Cuban baseball teams at both the collegiate and
professional levels).
43. OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF BASEBALL, MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, THE OFFICIAL
PROFESSIONAL BASEBALL RULES BOOK r. 3 (2017), https://registration.mlbpa.org/pdf/Major
LeagueRules.pdf.
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Puerto Rico must enter into the amateur draft. 44 Requiring these
players to enter into the draft means that the players are either selected
by a professional team and obligated to negotiate with that team for one
year or they are passed over by all teams and then allowed to enter into
free agency. 45 Players who reside outside of the United States, Canada,
or Puerto Rico may directly enter into free agency. 46 Because free
agency means that the player can negotiate with all professional teams,
and thus leverage bidding teams against each other, the rules seem to
favor foreign players. 47 Unfortunately for Cuban players, the federal
laws that constitute the Cuban embargo make it illegal for any MLB
team to negotiate with the players while they still reside in Cuba. 48 This
prohibition results in the MLB subjecting Cuban players to more
stringent guidelines. 49
FOREIGN PLAYERS OUTSIDE OF CUBA
For foreign players who are not granted asylum upon touching
United States soil, a work visa must be obtained.50 The work visas
available to baseball players who do not yet seek permanent residence
in the United States are separated into two categories: "0" and "P"
visas. 51
"0" visas are granted to exceptional baseball players who can satisfy
two requirements. 52 First, a player must sign a contract with a
44. See Klein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 278 (Rule 3(a)(1)(A) states: "A player who has
not previously contracted with a Major or Minor League Club, and who is a resident of the
United States or Canada, may be signed to a contract only after having been eligible for
selection in the First-Year Player draft."); see also Solomon, supra note 7, at 158.
45. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 395-96 ("Once an MLB team drafts a player, that
franchise holds exclusive negotiating rights to that player until just before the following
year's draft.").
46. Id. at 396.
47. Id. ("Free agency tends to produce larger contracts for these players, a result of
bidding wars between teams vying for their services.").
48. Id. at 396-97.
49. Id. at 397 ("MLB rules work with the political and legal considerations discussed
above to effectively compel Cuban players to defect if they want to play American
baseball.").
50. See Greller, supra note 6, at 1655-56; Cuba-United States: Joint Statement on
Normalization of Migration, Building on the Agreement of September 9, 1994, 35 INT'L
LEGAL MATERIALS 327, 328 (1996) (Cuban players are granted asylum upon landing on
United States soil under the "wet feet, dry feet" policy).
51. Greller, supra note 6, at 1656.
52. Id. at 1656-57.
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professional team before he can obtain an "0" visa. 53 The second hurdle
requires that baseball players seeking an "0" visa consult with a peer
group that can attest to the player's "extraordinary" ability. 54 If the
player can satisfy these two requirements, then he may obtain a visa
and also obtain visas for his spouse, children, and an accompanying
coach or trainer.55
"P" visas allow temporary employment for renowned athletes and
entertainers. 56 Like "0" visas, individual athletes may obtain "P"
visas.57 Unlike "0" visas, "P" visas can also be obtained by each member
of an internationally renowned team, regardless of his individual
reputation.58 A "P" visa requires certification that the individual or team
seeking temporary employment has a contract in place with MLB or
another professional team.59 Additionally, two of the following factors
must be demonstrated:
Evidence of having participated to a significant extent in
a prior season with a major United States sports league;
Evidence of having participated in international
competition with a national team; Evidence of having
participated to a significant extent in a prior season for
a U.S. college or university in intercollegiate
competition; A written statement from an official of the
governing body of the sport which details how the alien
or team is internationally recognized; A written
statement from a member of the sports media or a
recognized expert in the sport which details how the
alien or team is internationally recognized; Evidence
that the individual or team is ranked if the sport has
international rankings; or Evidence that the alien or
53. Id. at 1657 (stating that the team that contracts with the player is required to file a
petition that includes the locations and dates of each game with the Immigration and
Naturalization Service).
54. Id. at 1657-58 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(o)(5)(i)(A) (2018) ("Aliens of extraordinary
ability or achievement")).
55. Id. at 1660-61 ("Although the procedures for obtaining a ' visa are generally the
same for the '0' visa, the ' visa category contains less stringent eligibility
requirements and a longer period of stay.").
56. Id. at 1659-61.
57. Id. at 1660.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1661.
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team has received a significant honor or award in the
sport.60
For players, the "P" visa offers a very obtainable option for entrance into
the United States. 61 However, although the "P" visa allows for whole
teams to enter the United States at once, it does not allow spouses or
children to accompany the baseball player. 62
For foreign players being pursued by MLB teams, the procedures
required by the "0" and "P" visa categories are readily accomplished. 63
This straightforward process is in deep contrast to the experience of the
players' Cuban counterparts.
FOREIGN PLAYERS RESIDING IN CUBA
In 1977, Bowie Kuhn, the then-commissioner of MLB, published
MLB's policy on Cuban players. 64 This policy became known as the
Kuhn Directive. 65 The directive embodied the spirit and regulations of
the Cuban embargo and expressly prohibited any MLB team from
negotiating with Cuban nationals while they still reside in Cuba. 66
The intersection of MLB guidelines with the Cuban embargo means
that any Cuban player seeking to play at the professional level must
defect. 67 To reap the benefits of MLB Rule 3(a)(1)(B) and enter straight
into free agency, most Cuban players desire to defect to countries
outside of the United States or Canada. 68 This is because Rule 3(a)(1)(A)
60. 8 C.F.R. 214.2(p)(ii)-(vii) (2017); Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §
1153(b)(1)(A) (2018) (detailing the regulations for foreign immigrants of extraordinary
athletic ability)).
61. See Greller, supra note 6, at 1661.
62. Id.
63. See id. at 1657 (explaining the "0" visa category provides an "extremely practical
form of entry for proven baseball players"); see also id. at 1661 ("MLB's own operating
procedures with respect to the signing and drafting of baseball players tremendously
assist the ability of foreign baseball players to obtain either 'O' or ' visas.").
64. Frankel, supra note 5, at 397; see also Solomon, supra note 7, at 159.
65. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 397.
66. Id.; see also Solomon, supra note 7, at 159 ("The Directive, updated in 1991,
prohibits 'the discussion or negotiation with anyone in Cuba regarding the signing of any
player in Cuba.' In other words, it bars team representatives, such as scouts, from
speaking with any Cuban player while they are in Cuba. However, if a scout sees a Cuban
ballplayer outside of Cuba, there are no restrictions.").
67. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 419; see also Solomon, supra note 7, at 159-60
("Because MLB teams are only allowed to sign players who are residents of a country
other than Cuba, this policy coerces Cubans who want to play baseball to leave their home
and establish residency elsewhere.").
68. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 396; OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF BASEBALL, supra note
43.
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would require any Cuban player who defects and establishes residency
in the United States through asylum to enter into the amateur draft,
which is less desirable and time-consuming. 69 This requirement results
in many Cuban players seeking temporary sanctuary in surrounding
countries, like Mexico, where they can begin negotiating with MLB
teams before they step foot into the United States. 70
DEFECTION IS NOT IDEAL
Encouraging defection through MLB guidelines and federal
regulations is not optimal. Defection is not ideal for multiple reasons,
including the danger involved and the detrimental aftermath of
permanently leaving behind family and country.7 1
After Rene Arocha, one of the most talented and popular pitchers in
Cuba, defected by walking away from the Cuban National Team (Cuban
Serie Nacional or Equipo Cuba) as he and his teammates waited for a
flight out of Miami, the Cuban government tightened its selection
process. 72 Now team members are selected largely based on their
political views, leaving prospective Cuban baseball players who are
classified as a "flight risk" by the government with nearly zero chances
to travel overseas. 73 Unfortunately, this lack of options leads ambitious,
young players to defect to pursue professional opportunities in the
United States. Without the option to travel to the United States with a
team, defection is most frequently accomplished one of two ways, either
by boarding an amateurishly crafted boat or by subjecting themselves to
a human smuggling operation. 74
69. See OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF BASEBALL, supra note 43; see also Klein & Marcus,
supra note 3, at 263.
70. See Klein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 263 ("[A] loophole ... allows these players to
negotiate with teams once they have established residency in a foreign country."). Take,
for example, Yasiel Puig, who was smuggled from Cuba onto a small island outside of
Cancun before establishing residency in Cancun and commencing negotiations with MLB
teams. Id. at 261-62.
71. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 161 ("Defection is not a simple task; it entails
abandoning one's family, friends, as well as one's country.").
72. Id. at 162; see also Frankel, supra note 5, at 383.
73. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 162 ("Since the Cuban government selects the
players for the Cuban national team, they refrain from choosing players they deem to be a
'flight risk.' Therefore, Cubans who want to defect, but cannot leave the country, are
forced to resort to defecting by sea via tragically deficient means, such as a float or a
makeshift boat, or professional smuggling.").
74. Id. at 163 ("When the Cuban National team failed to add Yunel Escobar to the
roster, he decided that he needed to pursue his future somewhere else. After gathering
five fellow baseball friends, they organized their escape to America. On October 6, 2004, at
approximately 8 p.m., they boarded an undersized boat with thirty other people. The
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Defecting by sea as part of an individual or amateur venture is
especially dangerous if the quality of boat, ship, or raft is not seaworthy
or the vessel is overcrowded.75 Both occur frequently in the world of
illegal immigration and defection, and prospective players are left to
turn to these options when they are excluded from legal means of
immigration. 76 Defecting by sea is also dangerous because it runs a high
risk of detection.77 A Cuban immigrant caught en route to another
country is repatriated back to his home country, where he faces the
harsh penalties of an attempted defection. 78
The most consistent way for prospective baseball players to reach
U.S. soil, and be eligible for asylum, is professional, illegal smuggling.79
Although professional smuggling operations carry with them a lower
chance of repatriation or discovery than amateur trips by sea,
smuggling is still carried out under similarly dangerous
circumstances.80 Vessels are still frequently overcrowded and smugglers
frequently remove safety measures to maximize space. 81 Professional
smuggling operations additionally involve risks for the individuals
funding the trips, frequently those who have already defected or
weather was exceptionally stormy, with waves up to eighteen feet high. The tumultuous
waves broke one of the motors, requiring Escobar and the other passengers to remain at
sea an extra day.").
75. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 409-10 (describing how Alex Sanchez, the
centerfielder for the Detroit Tigers, "was eighteen years old when he and ten others
boarded a rickety raft held together with tire tubes, bolts, and ropes.").
76. See id. at 409 ("For the banned players who want a shot in professional baseball,
the dangerous water route becomes their only escape from an impoverished life devoid of
baseball. So long as the Cuban government maintains its strict policy of banning from
baseball those suspected of defecting, there will be players willing to risk sea voyage.").
77. See id. at 410.
78. See id. at 410-11 ("[P]layers that are interdicted or turned over to authorities are
placed in notoriously unpleasant detention camps, sometimes for months on end.... After
their re[patriation], the defectors [a]re banned from playing baseball, allegedly
threatened, and placed under surveillance.").
79. See id. at 412; see also Donald L. Brown, Comment, Crooked Straits: Maritime
Smuggling of Humans from Cuba to the United States, 33 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV.
273, 279 (2002); Cuba-United States: Joint Statement on Normalization of Migration,
Building on the Agreement of September 9, 1994, supra note 50.
80. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 167 ("In [November] 2001, thirty Cuban men,
women, and children each reportedly secured payment in excess of $10,000 to smugglers
in Florida for covert transit to the United States. They crowded onto a hired stranger's
speedboat on the north coast of Cuba for the 100-mile crossing under the cover of
darkness. When the vessel failed to arrive in South Florida the following day.. .the United
States Coast Guard was notified. The Coast Guard's search discovered a capsized vessel
believed to be that driven by the hired smuggler, but no survivors or bodies were found.
This event is typical of many unsuccessful human smuggling trips in the Straits of
Florida, as smuggling has flourished in this corridor since 1998.").
81. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 413.
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professional baseball agents, who are subject to federal criminal
penalties if the operation is uncovered and the players are intercepted.82
CHANGE IS NECESSARY
The current state of affairs between the United States and Cuba
results in a player choosing between his future and his home if he has
aspirations to earn a living by playing baseball. 83 Cuban baseball
players face an especially harsh decision due to the animosity they
receive from the Cuban government on defection. 84 The government
labels defecting baseball players as traidores al beisbol (baseball
traitors) and adjusts their Cuban statistics or records to show that they
have abandoned their home country.85
The prohibitions and animosity between the two countries mean
that, once he has defected, no Cuban baseball player can return home to
his family. 86 In some cases, baseball players leave behind wives and
young children who must then make the perilous journey to the United
States alone or face an indefinite separation from their husband and
father.8 7 These circumstances are heart-wrenching, especially given the
fact that every Cuban baseball player defects without any certainty that
his dreams of playing in the major leagues will materialize.8 8 Because
the laws and guidelines put in place prevent MLB officials from
82. See id. at 415 ("By planning and providing payment for the activities, the players
and their agents expose themselves to serious criminal penalties under federal law."); see
also 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a) (2018) (criminal penalties for bringing in and harboring certain
aliens).
83. See id. at 402 ("By defecting, players relinquish their basic human right to return
home, a right 'fundamental [to] exercising one's personal autonomy."' (quoting HURST
HANNUM, THE RIGHT TO LEAVE AND RETURN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 56-60
(1987)).
84. See id. ("The Cuban government reinforces the implication that defecting players
have rejected all things Cuban by laboring mightily to create a public facade of
intransigence, anger, and disgust.").
85. See id.
86. See id. at 403.
87. See id. at 404-05 (discussing how Chicago White Sox pitcher, Jose Contreras,
defected without even telling his wife, leaving her and his young daughters alone in Cuba.
Although Contreras and his agent attempted to bring his family to the United States
through one of the few still available forms of legal emigration, the Cuban government
denied the request due to Contreras status as a baseball traitor. As a consequence, his
wife and young daughters had to make the dangerous journey from Cuba to the United
States on a small vessel, more than a year since Contreras had left them in Cuba.).
88. Id. at 407 ("Family separation is even more tragic when one considers the high rate
of failure among MLB prospects. Most Cuban defectors never play a game at the major
league level, and those who do reach MLB can be hampered by injuries or, for older
players, age-related decline.").
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contacting or negotiating with Cuban baseball players prior to their
defection, there is currently no way for players to acquire an accurate
assessment of their talent or opportunities. 89 This system leaves Cuban
players with an extremely difficult decision and with no empirical
evidence to justify their decision to seek a professional position.90
The dangers surrounding defection, compounded by the inhumane
results, demonstrate that the current framework of guidelines, rules,
and laws is not an adequate way to optimize the opportunities MLB
offers Cuban baseball players.9 1 Additionally, the current system's
encouragement of defection is contrary to the political viewpoints of
both the United States and Cuba, which have jointly agreed to prevent
unsafe and risky defections from Cuba. 92 The system should be reformed
to open the market for baseball players between the United States and
Cuba so there is less animosity between the two countries and less
detrimental consequences when a Cuban player seeks to play at a
higher level than offered by his country's amateur system. The first step
in this process is the re-establishment of a civil relationship between the
two countries. Baseball has proven to be an effective, although slow-
moving tool in this more pleasant direction.
BRIGHT SPOT: THE BALTIMORE ORIOLES AND THE NEW CUBAN SERIE
NACIONAL
Although relations between the United States and Cuba remained
rocky for most of the 1990s, in 1999 the Clinton administration put
forth an olive branch in the form of the Baltimore Orioles. 93 Before the
MLB season began, the Orioles traveled to Cuba for multiple games
89. Id. at 408 ("[I]t is questionable whether players would be as eager to leave Cuba if
given a realistic assessment of their chances of success.").
90. Id. ("Yet, asking whether or not the trade-off-giving up one's family for a chance
to play professionally in America-is worthwhile seems to be the wrong question to ask. A
better question might be why Cubans are the only ballplayers on the planet who are
forced to choose between their families and professional baseball.").
91. Id. ("The very fact that young Cuban ballplayers must make this forced choice is
ample evidence that the system is broken and needs to be overhauled.").
92. Id. at 407 ("Agents often compound this problem by enticing players to defect,
inflating their capabilities, helping them sign a professional contract, and abruptly
moving on to the next big catch."); see also id. at 401 ("In encouraging such action, the
defection system runs counter to Cuba's and the United States' 'common interest in
preventing unsafe departures from Cuba which risk loss of human life."' (quoting Cuba-
United States: Joint Statement on Normalization of Migration, Building on the Agreement
of September 9, 1994, supra note 50)).
93. Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Baseball Diplomacy, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 473, 474
(2001).
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against the Cuban National team. 94 And shortly thereafter, the Cuban
team traveled to Baltimore for a round of exhibition games.95 Although
the trip received mixed reviews due to various opinions regarding the
recruitment of Cuban defectors, the trip was a cooperative measure
carried out in concert by the United States and Cuban government. 96
The trip also spoke to an important balance: while the Cuban players
were exposed to a significantly more competitive level of play, the MLB
teams promised that the games were not a recruiting exercise, thus
opening the door to a more competitive and free market, while not
stepping on the socialist ideals of the Cuban government.97
Fourteen years after this attempt to use baseball as a peace tool,
there was some favorable movement toward an open market amongst
the Cuban ranks.9 8 In September 2013, Fidel Castro and executive
members of the Cuban National Team decided to allow players to travel
overseas and participate in professional leagues in Japan and Mexico.9 9
Although the administration did not alleviate its harsh stance on
baseball defectors, allowing Cuban players to participate in professional
leagues was a big change from the directives originally set forth by
Castro. 100 This slight change in policy suggests that the Cuban
government may have warmed to the idea of allowing their star players
to form relationships with other teams. And perhaps it suggests that the
Cuban government is subtly relaxing from its original fear of losing
players to professional leagues. To further the changes hinted at by the
new Cuban Serie Nacional, reforms must be put in place that will foster
trust between the United States and Cuba and eventually lead to the
legal and safe participation of Cuban players in MLB.
94. Id. at 475.
95. Id.
96. Id.; see also Greller, supra note 6, at 1694 ("[T]he exhibition games between the
Orioles and the Cuban National team illustrated baseballs power to bring the Cuban and
American people closer together. Although both nations asserted that the games only
represented people-to-people contacts, and not an attempt to normalize relations, the
potential exists for baseball to forge closer ties between the two nations without
abandoning their principles.").
97. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 156 ("The government adopted a Soviet model of
physical culture, which stressed 'mass participation in sports and the development of
champions."' (quoting Katherine E. Baird, Cuban Baseball: Ideology, Politics, and Market
Forces, 29 J. SPORT & Soc. ISSUES 164, 167 (2005))).
98. Klein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 273-74.
99. Id. at 273.
100. Id.
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PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Any initial reform to MLB and its relationship with Cuba must be
considered within Cuba's prohibitions against immigration to the
United States and the United States' reciprocal embargo. Although
baseball may be an effective vehicle for bringing about change, the
procedure for commencing such an idealistic goal must be built within
the existing framework. Scholarship on the intersection of baseball,
immigration, and Cuba offers a variety of solutions. 101 The consensus
among these solutions is that baseball is an effective vehicle for bringing
about positive change in United States-Cuba relations.1 02 Where the
theories differ is exactly how to place baseball, more specifically MLB,
in the best position to optimize its significance. 103 Some theories propose
a worldwide draft, or simply removing the Kuhn Directive. 104 Although
a worldwide draft has its strong points and removing the Kuhn
Directive is necessary to allow for better treatment of Cuban players,
these are not the most developed of the proposed solutions.105 Instead,
the solutions that are the most practical are the ones that combine the
removal or relaxing of prohibitory legislation and guidelines with a
compensation plan that pays back nations who lose talent to MLB. 106
A worldwide draft refers to an amateur draft held exclusively for
foreign players, which would mirror the draft held for domestic
players. 107 The idea behind this theory is that eliminating the direct free
agency option for foreign, including Cuban, players would deter bidding
wars that drive up the price of foreign players. 108 In turn, the more
moderate contract sizes produced by the limited negotiations with a
single team would keep predatory agents from violating the Kuhn
101. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 185-86 (describing how baseball has been used as an
instrument for social change in the past, and how both nations share a common history
with the sport); see also Greller, supra note 6, at 1700-12 (describing possible changes to
the MLB draft, signing process, and immigration law).
102. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 186 ("Baseball is as much a part, if not more, of
United States-Cuba past relations and should be an integral part of the future United
States-Cuba relationship. Altering the current Cuban baseball policy has the potential of
effecting U.S.-Cuban relations as a whole.").
103. See Klein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 311 ("There is currently no one-size-fits-all
solution. . . .").
104. Id. at 298-99 (citing Scott M. Cwiertny, Comment, The Need for a Worldwide
Draft: Major League Baseball and its Relationship with the Cuban Embargo and United
States Foreign Policy, 20 Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REv. 391, 426 (2000)); see also Frankel, supra
note 5, at 419.
105. Frankel, supra note 5, at 420.
106. See Ottenson, supra note 11, at 772; Greller, supra note 6, at 1705.
107. See Klein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 298-99.
108. Id.
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Directive and persuading players to defect. 109 Although there are
tangible positives to a worldwide draft, the solution does not get at the
heart of the issue. 110 A worldwide draft may change some of the
incentives surrounding defection but it does nothing to change the
policies that would still forbid Cuban players from participating at the
professional level.111 As a result, Cuban players would still be left with
the same limited options, either play amateur ball in Cuba or defect. As
a result of the draft, those defectors would also be without any financial
support from the "predatory" agents who have helped them reach
America and pursue their goals for the last two decades. 112 Without
looking toward a change in policy, the worldwide draft is certainly not
the best way to use baseball to improve diplomatic relations. 113
Unlike the worldwide draft, removing the Kuhn Directive is
imperative to reestablishing a relationship between MLB and the
Cuban amateur system. 114 Unfortunately, while the provisions that
make up the Cuban embargo are still in place, removing the Directive
will not result in any practical changes as any negotiation or transfer of
business between MLB and Cuba would still violate the embargo. 115
Accordingly, removing the Kuhn Directive is merely a policy shift that
would hopefully influence the federal government to consider relaxing
the embargo, at least in part. 116 As a result, the end of the Kuhn
Directive is not an all-around solution. 117
109. Id. at 299 ("[T]his would lower the temptation for MLB scouts to breach the Kuhn
Directive and the current embargo.").
110. Frankel, supra note 5, at 420 ("But a worldwide draft could also cause negative
consequences for Cuban ballplayers. From a humanitarian standpoint, a worldwide draft
is not likely to improve the current system materially.").
111. Id.
112. Id. ("Without the help of an agent-or, more specifically, his bank account-many
players will lack the financial resources needed to defect successfully. . . . Thus, by chilling
agent involvement in Cuba, a draft might have the unfortunate effect of trapping more
young ballplayers in their economically failing, authoritarian country.").
113. Id. ("It is conceivable that a global draft will 'create[] more problems than it
solves."' (quoting Dave Sheinin, Player Draft Remains Unsettled, WASH. POST (June 3,
2003), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/sports/2003/06/03/player-draft-remains-
unsettled/2218905d-87ef-4805-8ad8-cbec5c76afla/?utm term=. idall954ae61)).
114. Id. at 422.
115. Id. ("Since the Directive is best viewed simply as MLB's reiteration of the
restraints imposed by the Cuban embargo, such action would be relatively ineffectual.").
116. Id.
117. Id. at 422-23 ("[I]t would only be a symbolic gesture to revoke the Kuhn Directive
before the embargo is substantively altered to accommodate Cuban ballplayers.").
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A COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION
Unsurprisingly, the most effective solution combines the changes
previously suggested with policy reforms. Removing or replacing the
Kuhn Directive is certainly the first step toward opening MLB to Cuban
players. 118 In that same vein, the second step is the reformation of
MLB's acquisition rules. 119 A change in the rules that would require all
players, foreign and domestic, to enter into the amateur draft would
eliminate the disparities in freedom of contract and contract price that
incentivize Cuban players to defect to other nations before seeking
asylum in the United States. 120 Like the worldwide draft, requiring all
players to enter into an amateur draft does not bring about effective
policy changes, but it does alleviate some of the pressure that
incentivizes so many to defect.1 21 Instituting the universal amateur
draft is an integral part of the process. 122 Updating guidelines and rules
to reflect MLB's willingness and desire to bring Cuban players into the
professional circuit lays vital groundwork for important policy
changes. 123
The change that has the ability to truly build a bridge between the
United States and Cuba is the establishment of a contract tax, which
would apply when MLB teams enter into contracts with Cuban
players. 124 The tax would be paid by MLB teams to a central revenue
fund, which the league could use to support the Cuban baseball
system. 125 MLB could use the funds collected by the tax to help develop
the Cuban baseball system and work toward reestablishing MLB
influence in Cuban baseball. 126 The tax, although not without issues, is
118. See Greller, supra note 6, at 1700.
119. Id. at 1702-03 ("To remain close to the Cuban government's desire to respect the
principles of Cuban sports and to bolster the competitive balance within MLB, Baseball
Diplomacy requires further proactive efforts. Accordingly, MLB must implement a system
that exposes Cuban players who desire to play in MLB to the June Draft, instead of
allowing these players to follow the 'El Duque' model [of defection].").
120. See Klein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 298-99.
121. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 420.
122. See Greller, supra note 6, at 1705 ("Drafting Cuban players, therefore, will allow
Baseball Diplomacy to move halfway towards its goals, and advance to Second Base.").
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. ("Much like the payroll and player salary taxes that go to baseballs central
revenue fund, MLB teams should pay a tax on the contracts signed by Cuban players into
a MLB fund designed to support both the Cuban baseball infrastructure and the Cuban
scouting efforts of all thirty MLB teams.").
126. Id. at 1706 ("Thus, while the United States will absorb talented Cuban players, the
success of these players will assist the development of future Cuban stars by improving
the infrastructure of Cuban baseball through better equipment and training.").
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a practical way for the asset that is a player's talent to be shared more
proportionately by all interested parties.127 This acknowledges that the
transfer of talent from Cuba to the United States financially impacts
Cuba and works to rectify that impact. 128 Instituting a contract tax
would also demonstrate to Cuba that MLB is interested in developing
talent and giving players the best opportunities instead of simply
enticing Cuban players to betray their homeland under the auspices of
capitalist gains. 129
The return of MLB influence in the Cuban system would relieve
major problems in the current system. 130 Specifically, with MLB
representatives in Cuba, it would be possible to assess a player's talent
without him leaving the island.131 The ability to assess talent prior to
immigration allows Cuban baseball players to access accurate
information regarding their chances of success at a professional level. 132
This would mean that fewer players would attempt to defect, risking life
and status in the process. 133 Hopefully, as MLB and Cuba rebuild
networks of communication and work in concert for the betterment of
players and systems, the United States and Cuba could establish more
easily accessible routes for immigration that would eliminate the
player's need to defect.
THE BROAD IMPACT OF MLB CHANGES
By first replacing prohibitory guidelines with more lenient options
and fostering an avenue of open communication and cooperation, MLB
can build a relationship with Cuba that will effectively alleviate some of
the tensions present between the United States, U.S. organizations, and
127. See Ottenson, supra note 11, at 789 ("This payment will serve as compensation for
the social costs of MLB recruitment in the country.").
128. Id.
129. Id. at 790 ("This will help to disentangle local baseball operations from the
neocolonial aspects of MLB recruitment in the region by shifting control over local
baseball operations from MLB teams back towards the countries themselves."); see also
Klein & Marcus, supra note 3, at 267 ("Officials of the Revolution believed that the profit
motive under a capitalist system corrupted the sport.").
130. See Ottenson, supra note 11, at 790.
131. Under the Kuhn directive, MLB representatives and scouts are prohibited from
engaging Cuban players in discussions on Cuban soil. As a result, Cuban players are
required to leave Cuba in order to exhibit their abilities without ever having a
conversation with a scout who is aware of their potential prowess. Because the proposed
solutions would unravel the Kuhn directive, scouts could meet, see, and honestly discuss
the professional chances of the Cuban players without the players having to flee their
homes. See Solomon, supra note 7, at 159-160.
132. See id.
133. See Frankel, supra note 5, at 407-08.
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Cuba since the Cold War. 134 Paying homage to the role Cuba played in
the development of the players' talent through a contract tax is a
practical way for MLB to demonstrate that it, and possibly other
organizations, will take active steps to work with Cuba instead of
unilaterally encouraging players to abandon their home land and
forsake their team. Although these reforms face opposition in the form
of established regulations and federal laws, recent changes suggest that
both the United States and Cuba may be open to the idea of a
cooperative effort. During President Obama's tenure, changes to the
embargo were introduced to foster interaction between American and
Cuban people. 135 Similarly, toward the end of his life, Fidel Castro
entered into international agreements that would build political and
economic ties as a response to Cuba's deepening economic crisis. 136 The
new leader of Cuba, Raul Castro, has shown that he is more open to
reform than his brother. 137 Baseball, with its roots in the culture of both
the United States and Cuba, is an optimal starting point for the
rebuilding of diplomatic relations.
With a larger lens toward MLB and United States relations with
Latin American and Caribbean nations, the contract tax is a very
effective means for building a positive relationship. 138 In many nations
surrounding the United States, such as the Dominican Republic,
baseball players are enticed by the large contracts and fancy lives that
are available through MLB. 139 Although individuals in Latin American
and Caribbean nations, other than Cuba, are free to negotiate and
contract with MLB teams without an embargo or the danger and
134. See Greller, supra note 6, at 1712-13 ("Enacting these policies, however, will act as
a catalyst in that direction, and allow the world's baseball fans to collectively cheer for the
best baseball available. Ultimately, such changes will insure a true World Series each
October.").
135. Id. at 1697-98 ("The recent changes in the embargo against Cuba indicate the
United States' willingness to seek greater contacts between the people of these two
nations. Moreover, Fidel Castro's recent international agreements recognize the
importance of forging political and economic ties to ease Cuba's economic crisis.
Consequently, changes regarding Cuban baseball immigration can provide the impetus for
creating the greater contacts and economic ties desired by both nations.").
136. See id.
137. Steven Visser & Catherine E. Shoichet, Cuba: What's Next Under Raul Castro?,
CNN (Nov. 28, 2016, 2:49 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/28/americas/cuba-future-
raul-castro/index.html ("[Raul] has allowed some reforms to be enacted that Fidel would
never have been OK with.").
138. See Ottenson, supra note 11, at 790.
139. See Diana L. Spagnuolo, Comment, Swinging for the Fence: A Call for Institutional
Reform as Dominican Boys Risk Their Futures for a Chance in Major League Baseball, 24
U. PA. J. INT'L L. 263, 272 (2003) ("Most of these guys have never had three meals [a day]
in their lives and every organization is giving them a chance and an opportunity to be
somebody in life.").
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consequences of defection looming over their heads, players who flock to
MLB deprive their native countries of valuable assets. 140 Additionally,
many of these countries are in the midst of poor economic situations and
assistance is imperative. 141 Under these conditions, a contract tax that
would spread the money made off of an individual player amongst
interested parties would go a long way in forging positive
relationships. 142
CONCLUSION
Because a significant portion of its well-paid players hail from Cuba,
Major League Baseball is especially called to use its power to smooth
ties with the island nation. The improvement of ties between the United
States and Cuba is also a self-interested endeavor for MLB because the
quality of life for players will increase when their homeland no longer
deems them traitors and room for profit will increase as the price of
Cuban contracts goes down. As a major network of athletes that wields
a lot of influence over a large portion of the western hemisphere, Major
League Baseball should take steps to use that influence to affect
positive social and economic change. Similarly, the United States
government, in accordance with the policies promulgated by President
Obama, should utilize Major League Baseball's avenues of
communication and commerce with Cuba to effectuate long-lasting
changes to diplomatic relations, which would hopefully increase the
opportunities available to the Cuban people.
140. See Ottenson, supra note 11, at 790; see also OFFICE OF THE COMM'R OF BASEBALL,
supra note 43, at r. 3, r. 4.
141. See Spagnuolo, supra note 139, at 277-81.
142. Greller, supra note 6, at 1712-13.
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